Union of Fayhaa Municipalities
Engineering Emancipation from Deadly Routine
The Union of Fayhaa Municipalities and the Alternative Governance Model in Tripoli
Prepared by Attorney Khaled Walid Al-Sabbagh
Specialist in Strategic Studies and Public Policy
15 June 2026
Executive Summary
This strategic report presents a systemic analysis of local governance mechanisms within the Union of Fayhaa Municipalities — Tripoli, Mina, Beddawi, and Qalamoun — in 2026. The analysis aims to deconstruct the state of “learned incapacity” dominating the public sphere by examining legal bypass routes, emerging legislative frameworks, and solidarity-based financing models developed to overcome centralized bureaucratic paralysis.
The article proposes a transformative vision that redefines the role of the citizen: from a passive consumer of public services into a structural partner in producing legal and developmental sovereignty in Tripoli al-Sham.
Introduction: The Shock of Administrative Structure and the Deconstruction of Learned Incapacity
Between the founding decentralized vision of the Union of Fayhaa Municipalities in 1982, as a developmental and strategic lever for North Lebanon, and the current reality of the union’s cities — Tripoli, Mina, Beddawi, and Qalamoun — in 2026, a deep structural gap becomes evident. This gap is captured administratively by the phrase “below zero.”
The aging centralized system is attempting to impose a formula of inevitable incapacity on Fayhaa through bureaucracy and the obstacles of deadly routine.
Yet a sociological and legal examination of local response mechanisms proves the opposite. The city’s current crisis is not a biological destiny, but the product of deliberate bureaucratic engineering that can be dismantled. Tripoli’s strategic bet today does not lie in waiting for flows from a paralyzed central state, but in inventing “positive detour routes” and flexible governance frameworks capable of reclaiming developmental initiative and producing local administrative sovereignty.
First: The Dynamics of Starting “Below Zero” and Reengineering Administrative Assets
In urban planning and development policy literature, plans usually begin from an institutional “zero point.” The reality of Fayhaa, however, imposes a different model: one that requires clearing a complex legacy of accumulated debts, deteriorated equipment, and structural human-resource paralysis that has persisted since the outbreak of the economic crisis in 2019. Erasing the remnants of this legacy is the first foundational condition for relaunching administrative effectiveness.
This adaptive model is reflected in the rehabilitation process of the Union’s Fire Brigade:
· The equation of self-recovery: The Union succeeded in increasing the number of operational vehicles from only four to thirteen, including vehicles that had been completely out of service, by activating academic partnerships and local community initiatives.
· Direct operational bypass: In order to bypass sterile official funding channels, a specialized engine for the Fire Brigade was secured from Italy through direct funding and flexible coordination with the Order of Engineers.
Indicator of transitional efficiency
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“We have not yet reached absolute zero, but we have made decisive progress in clearing old remnants and securing the conditions for continuity,” said Wael Zmerli, President of the Union of Fayhaa Municipalities.
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Second: Law No. 21/2025 and the Rebalancing of Criminal and Administrative Scales
Law No. 21, issued on 17 July 2025, represents a decisive tool for producing a legislative shock within the structure of Lebanese local administration. After decades of systematic restriction imposed by Legislative Decree No. 118/1977 through strict prior oversight, the new law granted municipal councils and unions vital financial room for maneuver to confront hyperinflation. It transformed the figure of one billion Lebanese pounds from an obstructive ceiling into a minimum threshold required to ensure the continuity of public services.
| Authority to Contract Expenditure under Law 21/2025 | Previous Financial Authority under Decree 118/1977 | New Financial Ceiling Without Prior External Approval | Strategic and Field Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Head of the executive authority / President of the Union | Restricted oversight and transactions delayed for months | LBP 100,000,000 | Urgent immediate maintenance and procurement of essential operational materials |
| Union Council | Constant subjection to central guardianship authorities | LBP 1,000,000,000 | Approval of emergency infrastructure projects and sewage networks |
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Third: Systematic Positive Bypass as an Alternative to Central Paralysis
When the tools of the central state turn into brakes on development, systematic “positive bypass” becomes both a legal and tactical duty. The strategy here lies in redirecting funding channels so that they pass directly through international organizations and civil society, away from the guillotine of the Independent Municipal Fund and the bureaucratic pathways of the Court of Audit.
· The “Fayhaa Sorts” model: This project is managed in strategic cooperation with Spanish organizations. Workers’ wages are paid and cash flows are managed directly from the donor to the field, ensuring the highest levels of implementation efficiency.
· Logistical support from the Municipal Action Association — Amal Baladi (Municipal Work). The association plays a supporting role alongside the Union to develop executive performance and provide technical and operational assistance.
· The “ARC” model for solidarity-based financing: This model draws inspiration from advanced governance patterns based on direct coordination with the diaspora and the private sector to implement infrastructure projects through direct community funding. In doing so, it rebuilds the lost bridges of trust between citizens and the municipal institution.
Fourth: The Tripoli Emergency Fund — Blind Governance as a Tool for Structural Integrity
The building-collapse crisis at the beginning of 2026, which threatened more than 105 buildings with immediate evacuation, became a pivotal moment for the birth of the City Support Fund, or Tripoli Emergency Fund. Chaired by the Head of the Order of Engineers, Shawki Fatfat, this fund does not merely represent a temporary relief response. Rather, it is a real laboratory for applying tools of good governance and combating political clientelism through strict mechanisms:
· Blind evaluation: Technical and engineering surveys of damaged buildings are conducted without revealing the identities of property owners to the examining engineers. This cuts off favoritism and guarantees absolute neutrality.
· Lean and temporary structure: The fund’s mandate is limited to six months, after which it will transform into a non-governmental organization. A strict ceiling has also been placed on administrative expenses, not exceeding 8%.
· Strict dual oversight: Any financial flow requires two separate signatures from two independent committees — the Governance Committee and the Funding Committee. This creates a trustworthy fiduciary environment capable of attracting both international and local donors.
Fifth: The Solid Waste Dilemma — The Struggle for Legal Sovereignty Against Social Thuggery
The cities of the Union of Fayhaa Municipalities face an existential challenge in solid waste management. The operating contract signed with Lavajet dates back to 1998 — an outdated contract that is 26 years old and is no longer sociologically or demographically capable of absorbing explosive population growth of nearly 60%.
Although legal solutions were formulated through the Cost Recovery Law, the real obstacle preventing implementation lies in the phenomenon of “social thuggery” led by actors operating outside the law.
The socio-security dilemma can be summarized by the stark contrast between a significant mass of citizens — around 90% — inclined toward order and compliance with administrative rules, and a violent minority of “shabbiha” who obstruct field work through armed force, threats, and direct intimidation. The clearest evidence of this behavioral imbalance is the Union’s inability to deploy more than 25 waste containers out of 42 designated for the targeted area, due to threats and field assaults.
Warning against behavioral disintegration
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The hidden danger does not stop at environmental pollution. It also lies in the beginning of a slide among law-abiding citizens — the “decent people” — toward imitating the behavior of groups operating outside the law, as a result of their feeling that security protection is absent and that the sovereign deterrent power of institutions has receded. Accordingly, imposing order through legitimate security force becomes an obligatory passage and a precondition before activating any administrative or environmental plan.
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Commitment to Accountability: A Tactical Roadmap for Fayhaa’s Revival
Turning bureaucratic paralysis into an opportunity for local sovereignty requires an immediate transition from diagnosis to the executive front through three binding procedural tracks:
1. Institutionalizing Direct Investment Flows
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A specialized Donor Relations Office should be established within the Union. Its role would be to formulate and host projects according to international feasibility standards, while dealing directly with development funds to ensure the flow of capital without passing through paralyzed central channels.
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2. Activating Comprehensive Digital Governance
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The Union’s administrative transactions should be automated, and budgets, tendering decisions, and meeting minutes should be published publicly through interactive digital platforms. Absolute transparency is the optimal tool for breaking bureaucratic monopoly and restoring the trust of the electorate, constituents, and citizens.
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3. Establishing the Doctrine of Quadruple Partnership — PPCP
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The Union should adopt a Public-Private-Civil Partnership formula that brings together the public sector, the private sector, civil society, and local community groups to operate vital public facilities and recover the cost of services.
This must be accompanied by a firm official letter addressed to the Central Security Council and the Ministry of Interior, demanding the imposition of a sustainable security perimeter to protect municipal assets and waste containers from attacks by undisciplined groups.
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The strategic question now facing policymakers and legal elites in Lebanon is no longer whether Tripoli is ready to rise. Rather, it is this:
Does the model of the Union of Fayhaa Municipalities — in breaking through the wall of central bureaucracy through independent funds and practical decentralization — constitute an emergency blueprint for rebuilding the Lebanese state? Or are we merely inventing temporary cosmetic tools to survive inside a system condemned to institutional decay?
